知识卡片
危害分析先定义不安全状态
Safety关心系统是否进入会伤人、损坏环境或财产的状态,和单纯保持服务在线不同。缺失、多余、过早过晚、错误值及乱序事件都可能构成危险;错误显示也会诱导操作者采取错误动作。先用失效模式影响分析或自顶向下故障树识别安全关键功能,再设计避免、检测、遏制和恢复;新架构决策也可能引入新危害。
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在整书笔记中的位置
原书出处 · 1 处
- 避免系统伤害 · 查看原书依据
Architecting for safety begins by identifying the system’s safety-critical functions—those functions that could cause harm as just outlined—using techniques such as failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA; also called hazard analysis) and fault tree analysis (FTA). FTA is a top-down deductive approach to identify failures that could result in moving the system into an unsafe state. Once the failures have been identified, the architect needs to design mechanisms to detect and mitigate the fault (and ultimately the hazard).
参考来源
- 位置:《Software Architecture in Practice, 4th Edition》第10章《避免系统伤害》(来源项目:book-sources;源文件:extracted/Software Architecture in Practice, 4th Edition/_epub-src/ch10.html)
- 结论依据:所引连续原文给出本卡机制或取舍;条件与示例结合本节已读上下文解释。
- 原始内容:Architecting for safety begins by identifying the system’s safety-critical functions—those functions that could cause harm as just outlined—using techniques such as failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA; also called hazard analysis) and fault tree analysis (FTA). FTA is a top-down deductive approach to identify failures that could result in moving the system into an unsafe state. Once the failures have been identified, the architect needs to design mechanisms to detect and mitigate the fault (and ultimately the hazard).